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THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS OF TAKINGS LAW:
THE DISSENTS IN LUCAS v. SOUTH
CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
Richard A. Epstein*
I. TURNABOUT Is FAIR PLAY
An old and familiar adage of great relevance to the Takings Clause'
is that turnabout is fair play. The recent decision of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council2 illustrates the soundness of that general proposition, but perhaps not in a sense the Justices might appreciate. Most of
the attention to the case is rightly given to the majority opinion of Justice
Scalia,' with more than a passing nod to the concurrence of Justice Kennedy.4 These two dominant opinions present a large target, for while
they touch upon many of the most important issues of takings law, they
falter on at least two critical points. First, as a doctrinal matter, they do
not explain why one legal regime should be applied to the tiny, and soon
to be extinct, class of total regulatory takings, while accepting a far more
lax regime for the far more important class of partial regulatory takings.
Second, they do not explain how the idea of reasonable, or investmentbacked, expectations, on which both Justices place so much weight, explains or justifies the basic contours of takings law, or for that matter the
private law of nuisance, on which the Scalia opinion relies by way of
analogy.5
On this occasion, however, I shall not direct my fire towards the
views of the Scalia or Kennedy opinions, not because I am persuaded by
their reasoning, but because I have already reviewed them at length elsewhere.6 Instead I shall concern myself with the two Lucas dissents. I do
so for several reasons. First, it is important to make clear that takings
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School;
A.B., 1964, Columbia University; J.D., 1966, Oxford University; LL.B., 1968, Yale University.
I should like to thank Daniel Farber for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Jay
Wright for his usual able research assistance.
1. U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
2. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
3. Id. at 2889-902.
4. Id. at 2902-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 2897-99 (discussing "noxious use" precedents).
6. See Richard A. Epstein, A Tangled Web of Expectations: Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 44 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1993).
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law, like any other important head of jurisprudence, cannot be reduced
to a one-dimensional opposition between a single thesis and its antithesis.
As is the case with religion and speech, the number of permutations of
doctrinal analysis is legion. Many other consistent positions may be attractive to those who reject the decision of the Court while seeking to
avoid the deadly clutches of the dissent. Second, any conceptual difficulties lurking in the opinions of Scalia and Kennedy are borne of an honest
struggle to make sense of the Takings Clause. That task is complicated
enough when the constitutional text stands alone, but it has been made
more formidable still by the grotesque judicial gloss on the clause that
now passes for constitutional interpretation. The errors of Scalia and
Kennedy arose in part from their efforts to rehabilitate the Takings
Clause as a limit on government action in the teeth of an unbroken line of
cases upholding state land use regulation from the days of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.7 to the present.8
Justices Blackmun 9 and Stevens10 have no convenient excuse for
their sorry performances in dissent. The inescapable inference from both
opinions is that neither Justice believes any land use restriction should
ever be struck down under the Takings Clause. Their view is commendable for its enormous simplicity, but is disastrous for the amount of bad
state policy and downright mischievous public misconduct it invites. But
while these opinions contain little that is novel, they are elaborate and
exhaustive defenses of the conventional wisdom on takings. I think it is
instructive, therefore, to explain what is wrong with each of the blasts
that Justices Blackmun and Stevens level against the Court's modest efforts to reinvigorate the Takings Clause. In this Article I shall therefore
examine the Seven Deadly Sins of the Takings Clause.
It is best to begin with a brief catalogue of the relevant arguments
that are made by Justice Stevens or Justice Blackmun-treated collectively here as "they." First, they make a methodological argument
which holds that on takings issues courts should show deference to the
legislative bodies on land use issues. Second, they urge delay in the judicial supervision of takings questions. Third, they claim that landowners
should lose on the merits because landowners demonstrate no cognizable
7. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
8. I do not count the landowners' victory in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
483 U.S. 825 (1987), as a clear exception to that rule. That case involved a lateral easement
that the state wished to impose as a condition for allowing more new construction on the land.
Id. at 828. It is therefore an uncertain mix between a trespassory taking and a regulatory
taking.
9. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10. Id at 2917-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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injury. Fourth, they claim that any loss landowners do suffer is justified
under an unbounded account of the police power. Fifth, they claim that
the Takings Clause applies only to state actions that single out particular
individuals and not to statutes that enact general land use regulation.
Sixth, they claim that a restricted account of the Takings Clause is necessary to prevent inefficient over-investment by landowners. Seventh, and
last, they raise the institutional argument that a narrow conception of the
Takings Clause is necessary to avoid thefreezing of the common law into
inefficient forms. The combined effect of these arguments is to reduce the
Takings Clause to a hollow shell. The tragedy is that each of these arguments is wrong, or at the very least, seriously incomplete.
II.

THE FIRST DEADLY SIN: DEFERENCE

It has often been said that much of constitutional law revolves
around the initial presumptions the Supreme Court uses to evaluate particular cases."1 Thus any statute to which the Court applies a standard of
strict scrutiny is highly unlikely to survive constitutional challenge. In
contrast, if the Court applies a rational basis test, then virtually any statute will pass muster. Only if the Court opts for a standard of intermediate review is the outcome of any particular case likely to hang in the
balance. Classification, therefore, is critical to the entire constitutional
enterprise. If billboard regulation is regarded as speech and thus subject
to strict scrutiny review, the billboards stay up, at least if they are concerned with politics and not mere commercial speech. If the regulation is
regarded as a matter of aesthetics or land use, and therefore subject to
rational basis review, the billboards come tumbling down. 12 Differences
in the standards of review, therefore, place a heavy stress on the classification question, a stress that could be avoided if some uniform standard
ofjudgment were applied to, or could be brought to bear on, all constitutional cases.
Issues of classification arise not only across but also within constitutional clauses. Race, sex, age, sexual orientation and wealth all are subject to somewhat different standards of review under the Equal
Protection Clause.13 Within the Takings Clause there is a similar critical
division between physical and regulatoryr takings, whose inexplicable vitality the Supreme Court reaffirmed this past year in Yee v. City of Escon11. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
12. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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dido. 14 The bottom line is that in cases of physical dispossession, the
compensation is well nigh automatic, which is another way of saying that
strict scrutiny will apply to these actions.
Yet when some form of regulation is at stake, a far more deferential
standard is involved. In Lucas, Justice Blackmun reiterates the importance of deference to legislative judgments in the regulatory takings area,
citing the familiar line of cases that runs from Euclid,"5 through Carolene
Products6 and Berman v. Parker,'" to Justice Stevens' recent flawed decision in Keystone Bituminous.'" He then concludes triumphantly that
this long, undisputed line of decisions should dominate any analysis in
Lucas. Justice Blackmun writes, "[t]he Court offers no justification for
its sudden hostility toward state legislators, and I doubt that it could." 19
But it could have. One line of argument is that strict scrutiny requires legislation to pass two hurdles instead of one, a welcome institutional barrier if much of what is legislated is the product of special
interest legislation.20 A second response to Justice Blackmun asks
whether it is possible to identify any categorical difference between physical and regulatory takings that justifies the different judicial stance in the
two cases.
Here, for reasons that have been developed at length, the distinction
cannot pass muster.2 ' If one thinks that state legislators are benevolent
when regulating, then why impute to them a set of personal and institutional defects in the physical takings cases? By the same token, if compensation for physical occupation forestalls abuses by either a virulent
majority or a well-organized minority, why are these concerns brushed
aside in regulatory cases? Suppose that a large tract of land owned by a
foreigner-as was the case in a recent phone call I received on the subject- is down-zoned under some land use plan in order to induce him to
sell the land at below market levels to the right neighbor who can then
cozy up to the other neighbors on the planning board to obtain the appropriate permits for new development. Is there really no reason for hostility to local legislators?
14. 112 S.Ct. 1522 (1992). For my criticism of that decision along these lines, see Richard
A. Epstein, Yee v. City of Escondido:x The Supreme Court Strikes Out Again, 26 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 3 (1992).
15. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
16. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
17. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
18. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
19. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 12-14.
21. For Justice Stevens' treatment of the distinction in connection with the generality of
state regulation, see infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
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Physical takings then present the same pattern of risk as regulatory
takings, and vice versa. It follows therefore that some uniform judicial
attitude should inform judicial interpretation across the board. Why not,
then, adopt an attitude of deference across the board? To read some of
the modern scholarship on the subject, it might seem that uniform deference is indeed the correct response.2 2 Thus it is commonly said that in
many situations, it is not possible to figure out why the state should pay
compensation when it seizes the house of an individual citizen when the
citizen might, for example, have acquired private insurance against this
risk.2 3 But surely theories of this sort have to prove too much. The task
here is not to decide whether it is appropriate to include a Takings
Clause in the Constitution, for if it were, one could ask whether private
insurance was equal to the task in question.2 4 Rather, the questions are,
however archaic they might sound, how to construe the Takings Clause
that we have, and whether private property has been taken for public use,
in which case just compensation is-with a nod to the police powerordinarily required. To its credit, the Supreme Court has recognized in
at least some cases that the language of the Clause is too clear to admit
escape, be it by denying the taking or by automatically stipulating that
the compensation has already been given.25 If that decision rests quite
happily on a standard of strict scrutiny, whereby a claim of implicit compensation must be demonstrated and not presumed, then why the difference in the land use cases where the same political forces operate with at
least the same vigor they have had in the cases of actual dispossession. 6
The imperfections of politics therefore supply a strong reason to put
aside deference and to do what these two dissents strive to avoid-to
look at the facts in Lucas on their individual merits.
22. See, eg., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensationfor Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279 (1992); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509 (1986).
23. For a critique of the point, see infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion very much against the grain, see Richard A. Epstein, A Common
Lawyer Looks at ConstitutionalInterpretation, 72 B.U. L. REv. 699, 718-19 (1992).
25. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1937). "The
only benefit to which the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an organized society, established and safeguarded by the
devotion of taxes to public purposes." Id. at 522.
26. One could argue that an outraged public might object more to the visible dispossession
than to a regulation on use, but it is unclear which way this cuts. If the popular sentiment is
greater with physical dispossession, then it could well be that the need for legal protection is
greater in the regulatory context.
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THE SECOND DEADLY SIN: DELAY

"Justice Delayed is Justice Denied." The point of this common aphorism is that a timely result is every bit as important as the correct result.
When there is an immediate form of injustice, the ideal response is some
intervention by the courts to forestall it. Certainly in dealing with prior
restraints on speech, the Court has taken a uniformly hostile attitude."
But with property the more delay, apparently the better.2 8
Justice Blackmun makes this point as follows:
This Court has held consistently that a land-use challenge is
not ripe for review until there is a final decision about what uses
of the property will be permitted. The ripeness requirement is
not simply a gesture of good-will to land-use planners. In the
absence of "a final and authoritative determination of the type
and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject
property," and the utilization of state procedures for just compensation, there is no final judgment, and in the absence of a
final judgment there is no jurisdiction.
This rule is "compelled by the very nature of the inquiry
required by the Just Compensation Clause," because the factors
applied in deciding a takings claim "simply cannot be evaluated
until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive
position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to
the particular land in question."29
Both halves of the argument are erroneous. The lack of final judgment should have nothing to do with the question. If there has been a
taking of land by administrative action, then the individual landowner
should be allowed to maintain an action for the loss so inflicted. Surely
an action could be brought against the state if it took property without
bothering to go to court first. And the same should apply here. The loss
of rental or use value is critical, whether or not the final judgment has
been entered. If the government may properly be asked to pay rent on an
ongoing basis when it occupies property for its own use, then it could be
27. For an elaboration of the comparison, see Richard A. Epstein, Property,Speech and
the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHi. L. Riv. 41, 77-80 (1992).
28. Matters would be somewhat different if prejudgment interest at market rates were offered for the owner who later recovered judgment. But if what is lost is the opportunity for
development, a market rate of interest might still leave the owner worse off than prompt permission. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToxTs § 913 & cmt. a (1977).
29. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2906-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (first quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986)) (second quoting
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190, 191
(1985)).
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forced to follow the same procedures when it restricts the owner's use.
Compensation for an interim taking should be allowed on the strength of
what has been done; it should not be blocked on the strength of what
might, but need not, happen. This much it appears the Court in First
English30 was able to decide.
The second half of the argument is, if anything, more dangerous
than the first. Justice Blackmun writes as though a case will wind its way
to a final judgment on some predetermined schedule, no matter what
legal rules govern the liability of government bodies. But that bland conclusion ignores the powerful incentive effects that the legal rules create.
If a landowner is not allowed to ask for compensation from a government
until a final judgment is entered, then the government planners have a
new and excellent reason to prolong the procedures as long as possible,
for in delay they purchase unilateral insulation from accountability for
their past conduct.
The situation in Lucas itself illustrates the danger. Here, the initial
version of the Beachfront Management Act (BMA)3 1 called for a total
prohibition on new construction between the beach and a setback line,
established under the criteria set out in the Act. But the 1990 amendments to this statute altered the rules of the game to allow for special
permits under certain circumstances. So it appears that the losses between 1988 and 1990 could not be brought into reckoning as long as the
proceedings were not drawn to a close because of continued adjudication
over the same land on another statute. The jig need not stop here, for if
the state denies this next permit, it could reopen the hearings to take into
account new evidence. In effect, the entire protection afforded by the
Takings Clause could be nullified by a surfeit of due process. And for
what purpose? In ratemaking hearings it is common practice to determine whether or not a utility has received a suitable rate of return in each
distinct period.3 2 The gains and losses from prior periods are ignored,
because otherwise the matter will never be brought to a close. The same
principle should apply in the land use area. The state exercises an extraordinary power when it takes land on its own initiative. It should not
be allowed to act on a take now, pay later principle, when later may
never come.
30. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304

(1987).
31. 1988 S.C. Acts 634, amended by 1990 S.C. Acts 607 (current version at S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
32. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989); Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs
v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23 (1926).
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THE THIRD DEADLY SIN: THE ILLUSION OF
No COGNIZABLE INJURY

Justice Blackmun also invokes the familiar contention that no compensation is required in regulation cases because no property has been
taken at all if the sole consequence of the government action is to diminish private values. Thus, in opposition to Justice Scalia, Justice Blackmun notes that "the Court's prior decisions 'uniformly reject the
proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a "taking."' "33 In making this assertion, Justice Blackmun falls
prey to the common mistake of collapsing the question of justification
into the question of denial; for the moment he makes his general pronouncement, he veers off into a discussion of police power cases, where
the question is whether there is a sufficient justification for the regulation
imposed.34 I shall turn to the police power issue in due course, but
before doing so it is important to expose the error associated with the
denial that land use cases raise cognizable takings claims in the first
place.
At the root of the problem is that Justice Blackmun does not understand the difference between a loss of value attributable to competition
and a loss of value attributable to a taking. The point here is an old one
at common law, for since the case of the schoolmaster, it has been understood that it is one thing to harm an established business by compet33. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978)). He then quotes and relies on Professor Sax's
well known article: "Professor Sax contends that even Blackstone, 'remembered champion of
the language of private property,' did not believe that the compensation clause was meant to
preserve economic value." Id at 2915 n.20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Joseph L. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 58-59 (1964)). Blackstone's own view on the
subject is more expansive of-property rights. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*135, where, in a famous passage, he writes of the limits of legislative power:
But how does it [the legislature] interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping
the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered
as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange.
Id. The language of the exchange is apt, for the object of the Takings Clause is to ensure that
the citizen does not lose even as the state gains. For that purpose economic value must be
protected, and that can only be done if full compensation is made for the injury, including
consequential losses. It is simply not enough to satisfy the "no loss" condition that the state
provide compensation for the property taken, to the extent that it chooses to use it. Yet the
history under the Takings Clause has often led to that unfortunate result. See Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
34. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "This Court repeatedly has recoguized the ability of government, in certain circumstances, to regulate property without compensation no matter how adverse the financial effect on the owner may be." Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The proposition is distinct from that in the text and far narrower, depending on
what are those "certain circumstances."
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big with it, and quite another thing to harm it by shooting at its
prospective customers.3 5 The former is, socially, a positive sum game,
and the latter is a negative sum game. The same instincts carry over to
the public side. Thus, it is of course correct to note that if the state
should decide to go into competition with a private citizen, any diminution in the value of the citizen's land is not compensable, any more than
it is compensable if the competition came from another private landowner. To that extent the unwillingness to protect economic value is
perfectly consistent with the regime of private property because it prevents the first entrant in any business from securing a de facto monopoly
thereof in good mercantilist style. A similar argument can normally be
made that many kinds of noninvasive conduct, such as blocking a view of
the waterfront, or cutting off light and air, could result in a diminution of
value, even though these activities are no more compensable if undertaken by the state than if undertaken by private parties.
But the restrictions involved in Lucas, and indeed in all land use
cases, are not cases of competition or cases of blocking of views. They
are cases in which an explicit restriction is placed on what can be done
with the land by its owner. No such restriction is involved in either of
the other cases, and in private interactions any effort to prevent ordinary
construction is obtainable only by restrictive covenant, where the landowner is compensated either in cash, or more commonly, by reciprocal
undertakings by the other landowner or landowners party to the transaction. It is therefore not simply the loss of value that Lucas complains of
in this case; it is the loss of value consequent upon a regulation that restricts what may be done with the land in question, here, by taking a
restrictive covenant for which no compensation is paid.
The distinction between these two types of activity is not simply
drawn at random, but instead responds to a clear sense of what set of
legal rules will maximize the value of the properties subject to these rules.
In the ordinary case, if A has built his land with a view, any rule that
deprives B the right to build on her land is likely to reduce the value of
B's land. The most obvious consequence of the restriction is that we
have only one development, with one viewer, A. Yet if construction were
allowed, then B would have her view-often the same or better than
A's-while A will still retain at least a partial view. It is highly unlikely
that the sum of the value of the two parcels will be maximized if the first
to build can veto the other's construction which blocks that view. Sec35. For a discussion of the schoolmaster case, see Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep.
1127 (Q.B. 1707). For another variation, see Tarleton v. M'Gawley, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (Peake
1793).
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ond, the right to veto other construction creates perverse incentives in
the initial stage of construction, as landowners vie to build as soon as
possible in order to protect their own development rights and to crimp
36
those of other parties.
It is clear that in some cases the restrictions on development are
welcome, providing a place for the institution of covenants altogether.
But there is no coherent social account which indicates that total or partial government restrictions on land use are apt to maximize value (or
utility or indeed anything else), which is why the presumption is set
against the creation of veto rights in neighbors, or in the public at large.
There is surely a taking by the regulation, and the only question is
whether it is justified. Justice Stevens mangles the analysis on that question as well.
V.

THE FOURTH DEADLY SIN: AN UNBOUNDED POLICE POWER

When dealing with the question of the police power, Justice Blackmun pleads in the alternative. By arguing that there is no taking at all,
he posits that no justification for a taking need be provided. But in the
next breath he addresses the justifications that he thinks should be applicable. His point is that a broad class of justifications has been accepted
by the Court, so that virtually any case of land use regulation can be
brought within their scope. Again his demonstration consists in setting
out the familiar cases from Mugler v. Kansas,3 7 blocking the use of a
brewery, to Miller v. Schoene,3 8 ordering the destruction of cedar trees to
save apple trees, to Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,39 ordering a cessation of gravel removal below the water line, in order to show the broad
and capacious nature of the police power. Justice Scalia championed the
nuisance-control rationale,4 which Justice Kennedy rejected.4 1 Justice
Blackmun's sympathies clearly run with Justice Kennedy, but he is prepared, if anything, to push the point far harder.
Justice Blackmun's initial sally is one familiar prerequisite to the
constitutional demolition of any body of law. Justice Blackmun insists
36. The analogy to the case of overdrilling from oil and gas fields under several separate
plots of land should be evident. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 219-23 (1985) (discussing problem of oil
and gas rights and common pool).
37. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
38. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
39. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
40. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-02.
41. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a criticism of Kennedy's position, see Epstein, supra note 6.
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that the term nuisance is so "indeterminate" that it has no content at all.
Citing the well-known language of Prosser, he observes: "'There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word "nuisance." It has meant all things to all people, and
has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie.' "42 While there are surely aberrations that have been built into the law of nuisance, its basic content has
remained remarkably clear and stable over time. It covers the ground
between trespasses-that is, entrances on the real property of othersand nontrespassory invasions of the land of other persons, such as smoke,
fumes, noise and the like.4 3 In addition it covers a set of noninvasive
nuisances, most notably the obligation of lateral support.'
Whatever one might wish to say about cockroaches in pies, there
has never been a common-law decision that has held that the construction of an ordinary beachfront home is enjoinable as a nuisance. Certainly Lucas could not have enjoined the construction of his neighbor's
home, nor they his, under common-law principles, save by the merest
form of sophistry. Nor could Lucas obtain any order for the destruction
of existing structures based on those principles. Similarly, the case for
stopping the construction on the ground of support depends on a showing that the construction of this house is likely to damage the dune structure, which is unlikely for at least two reasons: No such damage resulted
from the construction of similar houses by other persons; and the massive movement of the coastline is attributable to major geological forces
that no pathetic beachhouse could either abet or resist. 45 Nuisance pre42. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2914 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 616 (5th ed. 1984)). It was
relied on in Joseph L. Sax, The ConstitutionalDimensionsof Property: A Debate, 26 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 23, 29 n.30, 30 n.31 (1992) (taking issue with my earlier comments on subject).
43. See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953).
[T]he feature which gives unity to this field of tort liability is the interest invaded,
namely, the interest in the use and enjoyment of land; that any substantial nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by
any type of liability forming conduct is a private nuisance.
Id. The words "liability forming" beg important questions, which are not difficult in practice,
given the types of conduct covered.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 28, §§ 817, 829; see also Brief of the
Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453), reprintedin 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1233,
1246 (1992) (pointing out complexity in determining what constitutes common-law nuisance).
45. Professor Sax develops at length the worst case scenario of what could result from
building a house on the beach, but gives no evidence at all that the dire consequences he
foresees will ever come to pass. Sax, supra note 42, at 26. Indeed, one feature of modem
environmental knowledge is how quickly nature can repair the damage from major disasters.
The eruption of Mount St. Helens was followed by an enormous regrowth of the region once
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vention was not part of the game plan: What was at stake was an effort
to secure a zone of environmental retreat to promote tourism and leisure,
and the use of lands for habitat.4 6 In sum, there may be some fuzziness
about the edge in nuisance cases as there is with all legal categories, but it
hardly behooves any court to call the law vague and indeterminate when
its own "ad hoc" tests for what counts as a taking are so amorphous as to
defy description. 7
The point is especially critical because Justice Blackmun does not
articulate any substantive standard to set appropriate boundaries on the
police power. Instead, the entire argument necessarily collapses back
onto the point of deference. As long as there are no guidelines and signposts around to organize the inquiry, the Court has to defer to legislative
judgments as to which harms are serious and which are not. In so doing
it necessarily obscures the line between "harm" attributable to the loss of
tourism (or the loss of habitat, or the blocking of a view, or the rise of
competition), and "harm" attributable to explicit restrictions on land
use, and the radically different social consequences that attach to the two
practices. Justice Blackmun's formula therefore reduces the protection
of the Takings Clause in land use cases to a procedural requirement, one
that asks the state to articulate the grounds for its restriction. But these
grounds are always available: In this case the serious public harm comes
because of the fragile condition of the beach. In the next case it will
come from urban congestion and pressure on the highway system. In the
next it will come from the need to maintain the character of the neighborhood. Harm is ubiquitous, even if there are rarely nuisances. In order to make credible any attack on the older nuisance formulations, it is
necessary to come up with some alternative intelligible line that allows
some greater level of state control without permitting all land use restrictions as a matter of course. And it would be nice as well if that line could
be defended in terms of the desirable social consequences that it creates.
On these matters, however, there is not a single word in either Justice
Blackmun's or Justice Stevens' opinion.
the lava cooled down. See Paul A. Witteman, New Life Under the Volcano, TIME, June 15,
1987, at 63. The most rapid growth in forests is often where fires took place. And marine life
flourishes when cargo from shipwrecks leaks into the waters.
46. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
47. See, eg., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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VI.

THE FiFrH DEADLY SIN: MALEVOLENT GENERALITY

Justice Stevens advances yet another argument to support the BMA:
its generality." The argument begins with the familiar quotation from
Armstrong v. United States:4 9 "The Just Compensation Clause 'was

designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' "50 It concludes with the observation that "[w]e have,
therefore, in our takings law frequently looked to the generality of a regulation of property.""1 Justice Stevens then notes that "[Ihis principle of
generality is well-rooted in our broader understandings of the Constitution as designed in part to control the 'mischiefs of faction'" and then
gives the now obligatory citation to The Federalist No. 10.52 The generality requirement in turn is said to lead to the conclusion that regulations
are suspect when they "single out" individual landowners to bear the
brunt of special exaction, so that any broad based zoning plan is far less
likely to meet with constitutional difficulty than a plan targeted to a
small group of individuals.5 3 In addition, Justice Stevens claims that the
singling out normally involved with physical takings accounts for the
higher standard of review in these cases. 4
Armed with this principle, Justice Stevens then identifies the layers

of generality that are found in the BMA. It is a statute that "regulates
the use of the coastline of the entire State,"5 5 one that is part of a still
more comprehensive federal plan to protect the coastline. "The Act did

not single out owners of undeveloped land."5 6 Rather, it prevented reconstruction of structures that were destroyed by storms and prohibited
the repair of seawalls. "In short, the South Carolina Act imposed substantial burdens on owners of developed and undeveloped land alike.

This generality indicates that the Act is not an effort to expropriate owners of undeveloped land."5 "
48. I have a longer discussion of this problem in EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 195-215.
49. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
50. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2923 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
51. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2923 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 43
(James Madison) (G. Wills ed., 1982)).
53. Id. at 2923-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2924 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
57. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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This last sentence is a gross non sequitur, for what follows from his
description is the conclusion that the Act is an effort to expropriate owners of both developed and undeveloped land. To see the source of his
error it is necessary to unpack two very different stories that travel under
the name of generality. Once isolated it becomes clear that no blind invocation of generality can control the risks of faction that Stevens has
rightly identified as one of the functions of the Constitution generally and
the Takings Clause in particular.5"
In the first case there are two separate groups in a society: one that
owns land on the coast and the other that does not. All land is undeveloped. The number of coastal landowners is forty. The number of
noncoastal landowners is sixty. The value of each coastal plot is 200, and
of each noncoastal plot is 100. The total value of all plots is 40(200) +
60(100) = 14,000. All plots are located in the same community in which
each landowner has one vote. A general regulation is now passed (sixty
to forty) restricting the use of coastal land. The net effect of the regulation is that the value of the holdings of the noncoastal owners increases
by 25% to 125, while the value of the coastal owners drops by 95% to
ten. No compensation is paid. When the dust settles, the total value is
now reduced to 40(10) + 60(125) = 7900. Is there any confiscation?
The first and most obvious point is that the total value has dropped to
little more than one-half of what it was, so that if the noncoastal owners
had to pay the coastal owners, they could not do so, and still come out
ahead. The second is that each of the coastal owners has lost equivalently; however, this general impact of the statute does nothing to prevent the confiscation. It only magnifies its effect by allowing faction to
operate on a mass production basis.
Justice Stevens referred to a more complex situation, with both developed and undeveloped land, 9 but that extension does nothing to
change the analysis. Keep the same numbers as before and add a third
class of landowners: ten who have built houses on the coast worth 300
before the regulation is put into effect. After the regulation goes into
effect (with a sixty to fifty vote) their plots are now worth 200 because
they are not allowed to rebuild. The values of the other two groups are
unchanged. It follows therefore that to the previous social loss of 6100
we now add an additional loss of 1000, with no offsetting benefit. Does
the confiscation of a second group of individuals offset the losses suffered
by the first group? Not at all. It is a case of misery loving company.
Justice Stevens' argument, transposed to another context is that it is ter58. Id. at 2923 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
59. Id. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rible to deport Jews from Germany, but perfectly all right to deport Jews,
Gypsies and Turks. Clearly, the greater the generality, the greater the
wrong, and the greater the risk of faction. It may be said that these
examples are too simple. Some people will vote against their own interest. All are not similarly situated. Logrolling and coalitions are possible.
All true, and all irrelevant, for there are just too many situations in
which faction will have its due.
What weight should be attached to generality? There is an answer
to this inquiry, but it requires us to return to the average reciprocity of
advantage that is so conspicuously missing in the example above.' Suppose that all the landowners lived along the coast on roughly identical
plots, and that the question before them was whether to restrict the use
of signs on their coastal lands. If all agreed to the restriction, there
would be good reason to believe that each person gains more from the
restriction than he suffers: otherwise why give the consent. At this point
the usual problem with holdouts arises: One party wants more than an
equal share of the gain. To overcome that problem, a regulation that
bound allfor the benefit of all should normally pass constitutional muster. The key point of difference is this: With the BMA, one group benefits and another group is hurt. It hardly matters how the composition of
either group is defined, once we are sure that there is little or no overlap
between them.
In the second case I described, there is perfect overlap. At this
point, each person labors under incentives that align his private gains and
losses with the social gains and losses. Each individual will support legislation only if it provides a net benefit. Because all persons are situated
similarly, the generality of the regulation only multiplies the net gain by
the number of parties subject to the regulation.
There are of course a vast number of cases in which there is partial
overlap between the members of the two classes. In these situations, Justice Stevens argues that the generality of the statute offers protection
against the travails of faction, and again he is wrong. To see why, consider the illustration he gives involving the transfer of support rights
from coal owners to surface owners. Justice Stevens thus compares the
60. The phrase received its currency from Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). There was no such reciprocity of advantage on the
facts of that case, for the support rights that the coal companies had purchased from surface
owners for compensation were taken from them without compensation under the Kohler Act,
Act of May 27, 1921, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198 (codified as amended in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§§ 661-672.10 (1966)), at least until the Supreme Court stepped in to require compensation.
The opposition between the coal companies and the surface owners is total, and thus parallels
the opposition between coastal and noncoastal owners in the above examples.
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situation struck down in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon6 1 with that
sustained in Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n v. DeBenedictis. 62 He writes
that "we found significant that the regulatory function of the latter [statutory scheme] was substantially broader. Unlike the Kohler Act, which
simply transferred back to the surface owners certain rights that they had
earlier sold to the coal companies, the Subsidence Act affected all surface
owners-including the coal companies-equally. ' 63 Again Justice Stevens misses the point. The coal owners may have shared in some portion
of the gain, but they sustained all the loss. The differential share of gains
and losses still allows for a significant transfer between winners and
losers. Thus suppose, on optimistic assumptions, that the coal owners
lose 100 when forced to surrender their support rights. If the surface
owners gain 100, half to the coal companies in the second role, and half
to surface owners who are not coal owners, there is still a net transfer of
fifty from coal owners to surface owners. So long as the percentages differ, there is a conflict of interest between the two sides and the opportunity for faction to take place.64 Where single individuals are selected for
restrictions not borne by others, the condition of perfect overlap is not
met. It is a fallacy of reasoning from the converse to assume that if the
generality condition is satisfied the overlap condition is satisfied as well.
Lucas is the obvious case where it is not. The use of generality therefore
never allows a court to dispense with an examination of the ostensible
distribution of benefits and burdens from any land use restriction. The
restriction is the taking, and the benefit is the compensation so provided.
Generality, without more, is consistent with massive redistribution or
none at all.
Once this framework is understood, it becomes clear why Justice
Stevens misunderstands the physical takings cases. If the land of one
person is occupied for the benefit of all, the condition of perfect overlap is
not satisfied. If ten persons each own equal amounts of land bordering a
road, the land can be taken from all, and no compensation need be paid.
But again context is key. If the road is a no-access highway only for the
use of interstate travelers then all landowners should receive full compen61. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
62. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
63. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2923 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. The failure to consider mixed cases thus cuts out the power of the disproportionate
impact analysis. A similar weakness is found in Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferencesand the
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984), where the willingness to condemn the exercise
of "raw" political power only reaches the all-or-nothing situation, but does nothing to meet
cases in which all parties are on both sides of the transaction, in unequal proportions. See id.
at 1730-32.
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sation: The ostensible generality of the statute only magnifies its effect.
But if the road is for the local use of those ten persons, then it is quite
likely that no one need pay or receive anything. It is of course possible to
have mixed cases with physical takings as with regulations. The road is
of special benefit to locals, but has benefit to outsiders as well. The regulation on exterior design benefits not only those persons under the regulation but those whose shops are in the neighborhood as well. The
principle of generality thus applies to both physical and regulatory takings in the same way, and for the same reasons. The total confusion that
Justice Stevens brings to a difficult subject is representative of the hopeless judicial disarray that arises when judges forget that the Takings
Clause is about, dare one say it, takings.
VII.

THE SIXTH DEADLY SIN:

CONDEMNING THE CONDEMNEE

The first five deadly sins are concerned with the judicial attitude
toward takings claims, the timing of these claims and the full range of
substantive issues, including the scope of the takings doctrine and the
patterns of justification and compensation that are available to the state.
The sixth deadly sin switches focus somewhat and seeks to make the
condemnee the villain of the piece. There is today a fairly extensive literature on the role of strategic behavior by the condemnee,6 5 which is dutifully picked up by Justice Stevens who writes:
Even measured in terms of efficiency, the Court's rule is unsound. The Court today effectively establishes a form of insurance against certain changes in land-use regulations. Like
other forms of insurance, the Court's rule creates a "moral hazard" and inefficiencies: In the face of uncertainty about
changes in the law, developers will overinvest, safe in the
knowledge that if the law changes adversely, they will be entitled to compensation.66
The argument has been stated in somewhat different, yet more precise
form by Daniel Farber on whose work Justice Stevens relied. Farber's
statement of the position reads as follows:
Suppose a landowner is considering a further investment
in his property, but there is some chance that the property will
be flooded by a proposed dam. We would like the owner to
consider this possibility when deciding whether to make an in65. See, eg., supra note 22.
66. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2922 n.5. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Daniel A. Farber,
Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 125 (1992)). The same
analysis is advanced in Farber, supra note 22.
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vestment, since the investment will be wasted if the dam is
built. But if the owner can obtain full government compensation for the flooding, she has no reason to take the possibility of
the dam into account. (If the dam is not built, the owner can
expect a return from her additional investment, while she gets
her money back from the government if the dam is built after
all.) So the owner is indifferent to the possible construction of
the dam and hence will tend to overinvest, with a consequential
67
loss in economic efficiency.
These two excerpts raise important principles of takings law that
require closer examination. The first point to observe is that Stevens and
Farber have not made the same point at all. Farber's point is that the
construction of the private improvement may go forward, but if the dam
is built, and the property flooded, then no compensation should be paid.
Whatever the soundness of that proposition, it is a far cry from the point
at issue in Lucas, which is whether the government can ban the construction in the first place. Indeed, because there was no government project
of any sort on the horizon, Lucas would have happily abandoned his
lawsuit if he were told that he could build so long as he took the risk of
loss from any future government projects: None were planned, and any
that might be planned could not create any risk equal to the risks caused
by the natural elements. It follows therefore that the ban is inefficient
because it prevents construction of projects that could go forward without any expectation of future compensation.
All this is not to say that Farber is correct on his economic analysis
of landowner over-investment. He has only identified one efficiency loss
associated with allowing compensation for new private construction after
a government proposal. But in a world of imperfect coordination, this
one problem is solved only at the cost of creating another.
Here, the initial problem is how to determine the proper number
and scope of government projects that should be undertaken at all. We
cannot assume that government's choices are correct as a matter of
course. Quite simply, the government should take into account the losses
that its proposed projects will place on private development.6" We can67. Farber, supra note 22, at 285 (citing Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1985); Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 529 (1986); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1697, 1702-04 (1988)).
68. There are of course private analogies. A doctrine of contributory negligence as a total
bar places strong incentives on the plaintiff, but at the same time induces careless conduct by
defendants. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Torts in Which Victim and InjurerAct Sequentially, 26
J.L. & ECON. 589 (1983); Donald Wittman, Optimal Pricingof SequentialInputs: Last Clear
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not assume, therefore, that this problem has been solved, so all the legal
firepower should be directed toward creating optimal incentives for the
plaintiff. Instead the regulation of both parties has to be an issue, and to
achieve that goal it is possible to devise an alternative that constrains the
potential misconduct of both sides simultaneously.
There is a method that better achieves these twin goals. Quite simply, the government has this choice: When it announces its proposals, it
can buy out the development fights of private owners, that is, pay them
compensation equal to the loss of the potential value of the land use.69
The danger of compensation for wasted structures is thereby averted
while at the same time effective limits are placed against the risk of government announcement of a collection of proposals to preserve its options when only a tiny fraction of them can, and will, be seized upon. It
is indeed commonplace in the complaints that I have heard on local government behavior that a board announces some road or waste dump in
multiple possible sites, freezes development and sale, and then rescinds
its announcement. At its best, the practice creates an intolerable source
of private loss and uncertainty. At its worst, it is an ill-concealed effort
to impose a disguised interim ban on development, without having to pay
the price. This alternative is not considered by either Stevens or Farber,
even though it corresponds to the mitigation solution that is frequently
adopted in contractual settings: Once the defendant is in breach, a plaintiff cannot be an "insistent" performer, but can only recover an amount
that leaves the plaintiff indifferent between performance and breach, usually the sum of past expenditures on the contract-less salvage value, if
any-plus lost profits.10
To see how far off Farber's solution is from the ideal, it is useful to
revert for a moment to the nuisance law problem of "coming to the nuisance."'" In those situations the private defendant has built its plant or
Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law, 10 J.

LEGAL STUD.

65

(1981). A doctrine of detrimental reliance induces strong performance by promisors, but induces excessive contractual formation by promisees.
69. See EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 153-58 (discussing affirmative defense of assumption of
risk in takings context).
70. On the complexities, see White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor, 1962 App. Cas.
413. In general the proper approach is not to allow the insistent performer to perform after
repudiation has been received, but to grant a contract action equal to the lost profits plus any
reliance costs that have been incurred in the interim, unless the contract itself provides
otherwise.
71. See, eg., Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 28, § 840D. The issue is much debated in the academic literature. See, e.g.,
Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1080-82 (1972); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
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factoryfirst, and the question is whether it can be enjoined by a neighbor
who thereafter makes a use of his land that is harmed by the defendant's
previous activities. The illustrative case is the defendant who has a pig
farm in a rural area that is later subdivided. Even when the neighbors
come with knowledge of the existing activity, the usual solution is that
the pig farmer may be enjoined, after some suitable period, to shut down
his operations.72 There is, moreover, good reason for thinking that this is
an efficient solution, if only because it allows the pig farmer to use the
land until the actual conflict arises.73 Just this pattern of behavior took
place in Hadacheck v. Sebastian,74 in which a state statute enjoining the
operation of a brickmill worked for the benefit of late arriving owners. 7
The proposition therefore that individual plaintiffs should receive no
compensation for flooding when their construction takes placefirst does
not represent an efficient solution. 76 A far superior solution is one that
gives the government the right to condemn out easements to cause harm
if it so chooses, but to hold the government to the consequences of its
behavior when it does not.
There is a second strand to the argument that individual landowners
ought not receive compensation when their land is taken by the state. It
is that they could always insure against the government takeover in the
private market.7 7 The short answer is that they can so long as they can
find an insurance company foolish enough to underwrite the risk-which
the individual landowners will not be able to do given the risk of adverse
selection. The moment insurance is written on the property, it will be an
added inducement to engage in the acts of condemnation in question.
The local opposition to the program will be dulled by the compensation
from the outside insurance company. It will become common practice
by local governments to tip off local landowners of their plans so that
72. See Ensign v. Walls, 34 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. 1948).
73. For a longer discussion of the issue, see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice and its UtilitarianConstraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 72-73 (1979).
74. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
75. Id at 413-14.
76. For example, see William F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects ofAirport Noise,
15 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1972), arguing for the following liability rule: "Of two incompatible
land uses the one which had but did not take the opportunity to avoid creating costs of incompatibility should bear those costs." Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). This solution is hard to implement because as long as the first actor has foresight, he may be the cheaper cost avoider, but
need not be.
77. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 22. For an effort to introduce an insurance model of just
compensation, see Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 22, at 590-97. The difficulty with that
model is that an insurer does not normally create the very risk against which he is asked to
provide insurance. Here the just compensation requirement is designed to forestall unwise
projects that the government might otherwise undertake.
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they can get the insurance just before the condemnation takes place. Insurance companies could try to exclude takings accomplished in order to
exploit the insurance, but only at the cost of obscuring the coverage
under the contracts.
There is little reason to speculate on the losing nature of this insurance venture because there is adequate proof that these markets could
not survive. Presently, regulations on land use, short of total takings, are
largely passed at the whim of the state, without compensation. No insurance company faces a legal impediment against offering some form of
"lost land use insurance" parallel to lost use insurance available from
floods and other natural events.78 That insurance is just not available, for
it would be suicidal to sell it at all. The reason the government has to
provide the "insurance" in the form of just compensation is to reduce the
likelihood of misbehavior. Insurance provided by a firm that is unable to
control the probability and severity of this all too political event has no
allocative function, and cannot survive.
In sum, these efforts to defeat the applications of the Takings Clause
fail. The concern with excessive investment never justifies the ban on
development, but at most justifies a denial of compensation for subsequent government acts. Even that conclusion is suspect because it provides no limitations on the number and type of projects that the
government will propose. It is far better to require the government to
condemn development easements when it announces its project-or take
the risk of subsequent development. Finally, private parties cannot be
asked to obtain insurance against confiscation, because no insurer will
enter so perilous a market.
VIII.

THE SEVENTH DEADLY SIN: UNGLUEING THE COMMON

LAW
The last deadly sin of takings law is the assumption that rigorous
enforcement of the Takings Clause against general government action
will "freeze" the law into an archaic and inefficient pattern. To make
adjustments to new times, the state must have the power to experiment
with new forms of property rights.
The Court's holding today effectively freezes the State's
common law, denying the legislature much of its traditional
78. Kaplow argues that the moral hazard problem with political misbehavior is no greater
than the risk with fire insurance. Kaplow, supra note 22, at 537-42. That conclusion presupposes a very optimistic view of the operation of the political process.
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power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property ....
Arresting the development of the common law is not only
a departure from our prior decisions; it is also profoundly unwise. The human condition is one of constant learning and
evolution-both moral and practical. Legislatures implement
that new learning; in doing so they must often revise the definition of property and the rights of property owners.79
Justice Stevens then gives several instances of the need for revision:
the abolition of slavery and the protection of endangered species, wetlands and coastal lands.8" His point is fashionable, but it deserves an
answer on several counts.
First, why is it a bad thing to freeze a system of property rights?
There is another way to describe the same condition: Permanence, stability and certainty are all regarded as virtues of a system of property rights.
Indeed, David Hume, in offering his justification for the institution of
property, spoke of the need for the stability of possession as one of its
central features. 81 Where the legal system contains clear rules, then private parties need only take into account the inherent business risks of a
given transaction. They need not worry that the state will "redefine"
property rights in a way that leaves them penniless. Certainly in monetary affairs a stable currency is far more attractive than one that experiences large fluctuations, given the massive dislocations that follow from
either major inflations or deflations. And the problems in Eastern Europe stem in large measure from the indefinite structure of property
rights, which make it difficult to plan for long-term investment. The
power to redefine property rights is not one that should be vested easily
in any legislature. Surely it is a vast overstatement of legislative virtue to
treat legislatures as disinterested bodies intent on implementing new
learning.
79. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2921-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Bk. 3, § II, at 497 (L.A. Selby-

Bigge ed., Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press 1888). "Property must be stable, and must be fix'd by
general rules. Tho' in one instance the public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply com-

pensated by the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and order, which it establishes
in society." Id. Note that his emphasis on a general rule is picked up in all discussions of the
takings issue. But Hume's treatment is incomplete because he did not perceive the level of
illicit redistribution that could proceed under the guise of general rules. Nor did he (or for
that matter Blackstone, Locke or Smith) address the relationship between general regulations
and takings of property that is so critical in shaping the modem law.
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There are, however, some changing circumstances that do require
new property rights. Historically the rules have changed to take into
account the spectrum, the airplane and computer software. Yet before
one could condemn a strong system for the protection of property rights,
one has to show that these changes could not be brought about in a sensible fashion when the Eminent Domain Clause 2 is respected. Yet Justices Blackmun and Stevens offer no demonstration of how innovations
in these areas would be blocked by applying the Eminent Domain
Clause. Nor is it possible to think that one could be made. The shifts in
question are enormously beneficial for society as a whole, and have no
odd distributional effects, and thus pass muster under a takings
analysis.8 s
Similarly, the particular cases that Justice Stevens does mention do
nothing to bolster his stand in this case. Slavery is the antithesis of the
system of self-ownership on which any sensible system of property rights
rests. Its abolition should be regarded as a restoration of property rights,
not as a mere redefinition of them. (One shudders to think that we could
reintroduce it by simple "redefinition.")
The regulation of wetlands, endangered species and coastal lands
are, of course, complex. Yet the mere invocation of these interests hardly
makes the case for complete legislative discretion. There is, for example,
no showing of any public benefit in Lucas that is remotely comparable to
the loss of one million dollars in private value for Lucas, let alone for the
loss of development on the South Carolina coast. Likewise it is highly
debatable to think that the right way to handle endangered species is to
allow them to eat at will the cattle of private owners, who are not only
debarred from taking steps in self-defense, but also from being compensated for their losses.
The current administration of the wetlands laws also raises serious
questions because the government that takes has.no incentive to take into
account the losses that its actions impose on others. In each of these
environmental cases we do not have an impersonal invocation of new
property laws from which all benefit alike. Instead there are vast domains of administrative discretion that open up areas for faction and
political intrigue. These environmental issues are far better handled
within the framework of the old property law. Novelty and innovation
are not by definition social advantages.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
83. For a longer account of this point, see Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 747, 754-60 (1990).
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THE WAGES OF SIN

This survey of the seven deadly sins of takings law explains part of
the level of dissatisfaction that is found in this branch of the law. 4 The
usual doctrines that have been invoked to explain the largely passive role
of judicial oversight on land use regulation have little persuasive power,
even to the judges and scholars who invoke them. Yet, by the same token, they are unable to break free of the implicit assumption that any
coherent account of the Takings Clause has to allow the political process
of land use planning, and, more generally, of economic regulation to go
forward more or less as it has. Oddly enough, this background assumption explains the unsatisfactory nature of allfour substantive opinions in
Lucas, for while Scalia and Kennedy were willing to remand this case,
they studiously avoided making any statement that cast doubt on partial
land use restrictions. Accordingly, their opinions both suffered because
they were unable to persuade themselves that the entire area of land use
planning was always in tension with the Takings Clause. The two dissents, of course, agree on the major premise that the Court has, at most,
a marginal role to play in takings cases. And they invoke the seven
deadly sins of takings law to gut its application altogether. It is a worrisome portent of things to come in the New Political Order.

84. "[Tlhere is no consensus today about takings law-only a general belief that the takings problem is difficult and that takings doctrine is a mess." Farber, supra note 22, at 279.

